Managers Explore and Exploit

organisational ambidextrousness in run How Managers search and tap Author(s) Charles A. OReilly ternion and Michael L. Tushman retreaded work(s) Source calcium concern Review, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Summer 2011), pp. 5-22 published by University of atomic number 20 straighten unwrap st qualified URL http//www. jstor. org/st commensurate/10. 1525/cmr. 2011. 53. 4. 5 . Accessed 27/11/2011 0422 Your use of the JSTOR muniment indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, avail circularize-bodied at . http//www. jstor. org/page/info/ around/policies/terms. sp JSTOR is a non-for-profit service that helps scholars, queryers, and stu dents disc everyplace, use, and build upon a dewy-eyed range of center in a trusted digital archive. We use breeding technology and as well asls to increase convergenceivity and tout ensembleay r maturationary forms of scholarship. For much information close JSTOR, please contact email defend org. University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to California solicitude Review. http//www. jstor. org organisational ambidexterity in natural process How Managers recoverk and proceeding Charles A.OReilly III Michael L. Tushman he life bridge deck of the average Ameri loafer is 79. Japanese coffin nail expect to live to age 83, Liberians to solely 46. The average age of a astronomic comp twain(prenominal) is much little than any of these. look into has shown that tho a comminuted fraction of staunchs founded in the U. S. atomic number 18 presum able to make it to age 40, probably slight than 0. 1 percent. 1 In this study, for stiffs founded in 1976, goodly 10% deliver the goodsd 10 old age later, leading the authors to conclude that De infract their size, their long financial and human re witnesss, average gigantic upstandings do non live as long as ordinary Americans. 2 plot of ground this is partly chthonicstandable because of the naughty mortality pass judgment among nakedly founded companies, first(a) inquiry has estimated that even turgid, easily- wee-weeed companies can except expect to live, on average, amidst some different 6 to 15 old age. 3 Ormerod, in a study of firm failure, note that all oer 10 percent of all companies in the U. S. , the largest and close- prospering economy in the archives of the realism, fail every single year. 4 In a study of the existences largest companies amongst 1912 and 1995, Hannah reported that precisely 20 firms re principal(prenominal)ed on her list for the entire period and many of those were in industries bid natural imagerys without lush change. In her study, the modal verb large firm failed. 5 why this should be is a puzzle, since when firms ar doing good they contri providede all the elections (financial, physical, and intellectual) to continue to be supremacyful. Yet the evidence is that most brasss do not survive for long periods of while.In addressing this conundrum, James a mediocre notes that central to the powerfulness of a firm to survive over period is its capability to exploit animated as establishs and dos in a profit-producing way and con mensesly to look impertinently-fangled technologies and tradesto configure and reconfigure organisational re addresss to capture exist as well as innovative opport whole of measurementies. In walks terms, this is the assembly descentamental tension at the heart of an endeavors long survival. The basic problem confronting an organization is to concern in sufficient victimisation to vouch itsT calcium c atomic number 18 look back VOL. 53, n wiz 4 pass 2011 CMR. bERkELEy. Edu 5 organisational ambidextrousness in carry through How Managers look and mould current viability and, at the very(prenominal)(p) time, devote teeming capability to geographic expedition to ensure its future viability. 6 March withal notes that this antici pates not the contrivance variation- woof-retention process of biological evolution hardly what he refers to as evolutionary engineering lore in which organisational experience and holding be use to streng in that respectfore developing and exploration rocesses and accommodate to changed environmental conditions. 7 Hannah, struggling to explain the survival of a comparatively small number of the worlds largest companies, markates that a plausible explanation for the survivors is that they had some intelligibleive architecture which alterd them plainly not othersto constantly replicate their early achievement and that such corporate architectures mustiness be conglomerate and difficult to station, observe and copy, for, if that were not the gaucherie, their shelter would be competed take dismantle by emulators. 8 In the yesteryear decade, a ontogenesis body of look into has examined how organizations can both(prenominal) seek and exploit. 9 One promising st ream of question has concentrate on how self-propelled capabilities may at a lower placepin the ability of firms to sense, seize, and reconfigure organisational as facilitys to adapt to changed environmental conditions. 10 With propellent capabilities, prolong agonistical advantage comes from the firms ability to leverage and reconfigure its real competencies and as eagernesss in slipway that are valuable to the node scarce difficult for competitors to imitate.In this view, alive(p) capabilities are embedded in organizational processes or routines around coordination, study, and conversion and lay off a firm to sense opportunities and thus to seize them by prosperedly allocating resources, lots by adjusting vivacious competencies or evolution revolutionary hotshots. These capabilities down the stairspin the organizations ability to brinytain ecological fitness and, when requirement, to reconfigure lively assets and develop the unused skills needed to add ress emerging threats and opportunities The Roots of organizational ambidexterityOReilly and Tushman argue that the ability of a firm to be double-dealing is at the core of high-octane capabilities. ambidexterity requires superior charabancs to accomplish twain circumstantial lying-ins. 11 First, they must be able to accurately sense changes in their competitive environment, including potential skys in technology, compeCharles A. OReilly III is the Frank Buck Professor of vigilance at the Graduate tition, guests, and regulation. Second, they domesticate of billet at Stanford University. must be able to act on these opportunities and threats to be able to seize them by reconfigurMichael L.Tushman is the capital of Minnesota Lawrence ing both existent and intangible assets to meet MBA program of 1942 Professor of problem tonic challenges. 12 As a changing capability, ambiAdministration at the Harvard Business School. dexterity embodies a complex set of routines inc luding decentralization, assortediation, targeted consolidation, and the ability of elder lead to orchestrate the complex trade-offs that the simultaneous seeking of exploration and exploitation requires. Developing these dynamic capabilities is a central task of administrator leadinghip. 6 NIVERsITy OF CALIFORNIA, bERkELEy VOL. 53, none 4 summertime 2011 CMR. bERkELEy. Edu geological formational ambidexterity in follow through How Managers look and Exploit Although theoretically obligate, interrogation on dynamic capabilities and ambidexterity is even so at an early stage. Conceptually, the need for organizations to both explore and exploit is convincing, and how do draw awayrs and firms in truth do this? At an operate level, how do the challenges of ambidexterity present themselvesand what differentiates the to a greater extent(prenominal)(prenominal) no-hit endeavours at ambidexterity from the slight successful?To develop a more chondritic sense for the directorial challenges presented by ambidexterity, consider the following troika examples. microph star Lawrie at Misys In 2007, microphone Lawrie was prescribed chief executive officer of Misys, a $1B FTSE 100 orbiculate supplier of packet arrangement and serve to banking and health care customers. Although Misys had been a star actor earlier in its history, by 2006 the firm was in trouble with margins and growth rates far below their competitors. It had grown by acquisitions and was a loose federation of 34 give away telephone line units with 6,000 lend oneselfees spread crosswise 79 countries.Part of Lawries setback scheme was straightforward to install car park practices crosswise the calling units to reduce be and look at crossingionivity. As a 27-year oldtimer of IBM and former chief executive officer of Siebel Systems, Lawrie k crude how to do this. more problematic was the potential disruptive challenge posed by exculpated source parcel, which threa tened the proprietary harvest-festivals from which Misys derived most of its current tax receipts enhancement. However, given the poor financial position of the confederacy, Lawries ripened squad was think on cutting costs and acquiring through the immediate crisis.With their legacy work and their powerful channel unit theater directors under cost, quality, and growth pinchs, assailable source experiments were seen as a needless dis travelling bag and a $300M cost. They questioned whether the company should divert scarce resources to fund an un accredited bare-assed initiative that, if successful, could counter agreement their current melody archetype? In addition, if they were to do this, how should the untested-fangled venture be organized and led? Ganesh Natarajan at Zensar Technologies Zensar Technologies is one of Indias top 25 traffic process outsourcing companies proving services to 300 of the heap five hundred firms.In 2005, its assembly line was grow ing only when Ganesh Natarajan, the chief operating officer, byword the chance to utilize a potentially radical ticklishware process innovation (Solution Blue Prints or SBP). SBP was a revolutionary way to do parcel development that, if fulfiled, would require a more collaborative relationship with guests, a different product development framework, and a different sales process. Zensars be customers, its top aggroup, its sales force and its product development staff were not burning some SBP.Like microphone Lawries aggroup at Misys, Natarajans ripened squad up and line of reasoning unit leading were preoccupied with their current byplay and cut little need to explore an go nigh that would require them to alter their current patronage model. When press by Natarajan to explore the reinvigorated approach to software program development, some(prenominal) superior private instructors CALIFORNIA trouble criticism VOL. 53, nary(prenominal) 4 summer 2011 CMR . bERkELEy. Edu 7 organizational ambidexterity in run How Managers seek and Exploit appriseed that SBP simply be coordinated into their active units. Others valued SBP to be spun out as a modern venture.In contrast, the attracter of the SBP find out wanted to thrust his own art unit account directly to the CEO. As Natarajan reflected on the challenge, he was sure that the company should pursue SBP but was unsure how to complex body part the new initiative to best ensure its success. Carolean b neglect-and-blue at defensive structure bay window Defense Corp (pseudonym) is a major U. S. demurral contractor with long-term relationships with customers in the military machine. Caroline White, a vice p lodgent and usual draw offr of a di mint, saw an mesmeric opportunity for growth in the new motherland Security securities industry but was frustrated in her groundss to develop this area.Her mission, pass by the President, was to ready a claim in this trading e quivalent to those it enjoyed in other defense markets. In spite of this towering-level approval, Caroline found backup difficult, with the business development funds budgeted by liveing units never available in the amounts see to itd. Instead, these seem to be siphoned off to support more near-term opportunities with existing clients. When Caroline pressed her colleagues in other business units active this, she heard complaints to the highest degree her new initiative.They saw her mission as less tangible and immediate than theirs, with a smaller output to enthronement, and labeled her enterprise as a think tank as remote to a real business. They also complained that her project lacked clarity around deliverables and inflection. Making matters more difficult, line of business leading were under prodigious pressure to deliver tax revenues and questioned the viability of Carolines rides. In the face of these obstacles, Caroline was resolved to ask the CEO to intercede. The question, however, was what she wanted him to do to ensure the viability of her alpha apparent motion?Given the foe, she knew that it would require more than just funding to ensure the success of the new initiative. Mike Lawrie, Ganesh Natarajan and Caroline White apiece face the classic explore-exploit dilemma. What itemally can they do? At a high level of abstraction, ambidexterity requires a go awayingness of precedential managers to commit resources to wildcat projects and the rigment of order morphologic units for exploitation and exploration. Most research on ambidexterity begins with the acceptance of these public characteristics. 3 However, while thither is popular agreement about the elements of ambidexterity, OReilly and Tushman stomach noted that what is wanting is a pretend conjunction of those particular(prenominal) management actions that help oneself the simultaneous pursuit of exploitation and exploration. What has been missing from the resea rch on ambidexterity is perceptivity into the core leading mechanisms that underlie how dynamic capabilities operate in practice. Thus, while directionally correct, the research is not granular enough to be of much use to an operating manager facing the problems described above.To be a great deal useful, what is needed is greater insight into the specific micromechanisms postulate for a manager to fulfill and operate an duplicitous outline. This phrase reports the results of interviews and soft possibility studies 8 uNIVERsITy OF CALIFORNIA, bERkELEy VOL. 53, NO. 4 spend 2011 CMR. bERkELEy. Edu governing bodyal ambidexterity in operation How Managers look for and Exploit of leading in 15 organizations that were confronted with the need to simultaneously explore and exploit. We use these data to baffle how managers actually dealt with the challenges of ambidexterity.In doing this, we also explored those activities that eliminated mingled with those more- versus less -successful attempts at implementing duplicitous designs. Leading the equipoised Organization In an attempt to measure up the specific elements of ambidexterity, we offer fivesome-spot promptings that are necessary for leaders to be successful at managing ambidexterity. 14 These are specific mechanisms that enable firms to successfully manage decompose explore-and-exploit subunits and to leverage mutual assets in ways that permit the firm to adapt to new opportunities and threats.It is the bearing of these characteristics that permits leaders to reconfigure existing competencies and assets to explore new opportunities even as the organization continues to compete in vaned markets. slay these elements, inertial forces keep the firm focusinged on the exploitatory part of the business. 15 Thus, we propose that ambidexterity is more promising to be successful in the presence of the following five conditions b A compelling strategicalal confined that intellectually justif ies the wideness of both exploration and exploitation. An articulation of a everyday vision and set that provide for a coarse identicalness across the exploitative and alpha units. b A sr. aggroup that explicitly owns the units system of exploration and exploitation at that place is a frequent-fate final payment system and the strategy is communicated unrelentingly. b bring out but reorient organizational architectures (business models, structure, incentives, metrics, and cultures) for the searching and exploitative units and targeted integrating at both aged and tactical levels to properly leverage organizational assets. The ability of the higher-ranking leadership to tolerate and resolve the tensions arising from secern alignments. To hold the logic of these, consider the effects on ambidexterity if these elements were not present. First, without an intellectually compelling strategic look to justify the two-faced form, t here(predicate) will be no rat ionale for why profitable exploit units, oddly those under pressure, should give up resources to fund small, uncertain explore efforts. As previous research has shown, managers routinely reject future threats and focus on short-run gains at the expense of less certain long-term returns. 6 Second, absent a customary vision and value, there will be no common individuality to put up trust, cooperation, and a long-term perspective. 17 Third, if the old aggroup lacks a consensus about the grandness of ambidexterity, those who are uncommitted will be encouraged to resist the effort, change magnitude cooperation, increasing competition for resources, and slowing down execution. 18 The absence CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT redirect examination VOL. 53, NO. 4 summertime 2011 CMR. bERkELEy. Edu 9 organizational Ambidexterity in Action How Managers Explore and Exploit f a common-fate support system and a lack of relentless communication of the double-faced strategy can further debase co operation and encourage unproductive conflict. 19 Fourth, without dissolve alignments for explore and exploit units and targeted integration to leverage common assets, there will be inefficient use of resources and poor coordination across the units. 20 Finally, if the leadership is unable to manage the conflicts and trade-offs required by ambidexterity, the necessary decisiveness processes will be compromised and end up in confusion and conflict. 1 regularity and Results To assess whether these five propositions are veridical descriptions of ambidexterity in practice, we conducted semi-structured interviews with precedential managers at fifteen firms that were attempting to manage both exploratory and exploitative units. Eight of the 15 cases were all(prenominal) successes or qualified successes as reflected in change magnitude growth or profits, trinity were blow over failures, and tetrad firms were underperforming before learning how to be fallacious and deemed successf ul later onwardwardswards. panel 1 lists these companies and the challenge severally approach. elderly managers and advert informants in severally firm were interviewed and asked to describe in detail how they assay to simultaneously explore and exploit. 22 They were probed about the temperament of their leadership challenges, what actions they had taken, an assessment of their pull ahead to date, and to invest those elements that they believed were helping or clogging them in accomplishing their task of exploration and exploitation.The focus in these interviews was on perceptiveness in some detail what actions had been taken and how these had been implemented. The end of these interviews was to specify in a granular way what leadership actions were associated with the organizations ability to reconfigure existing assets and develop the new capabilities needed for exploration. 23 Table 2 provides a summary of the comparative results across the fifteen organizations stu died. These results suggest that there are themes associated with the leadership of more- versus less-successful bimanual designs.The first proposition offered by OReilly and Tushman suggests that ambidexterity is facilitated when there is a compelling strategic wrapped that intellectually justifies the explore and exploit strategy. In individually of the 15 cases investigated here, there was a cook strategic feeling on the part of the organization to pursue an exploratory venture (this obviously reflects our sample selection where cases were chosen base on their attempt to be bimanual). While each of the 15 firms articulate a strategic endeavor, only ten were able to actually scarper such an aspiration.The articulation of a give notice strategic intent promiscuously does not discriminate mingled with more- versus less-successful attempts to implement fallacious designs. Other research has documented the transformation of firms occurring without an explicit ambidexteri ty strategy. 24 These results suggest that while 10 uNIVERsITy OF CALIFORNIA, bERkELEy VOL. 53, NO. 4 spend 2011 CMR. bERkELEy. Edu organisational Ambidexterity in Action How Managers Explore and Exploit remit 1. sample description ( act on bordering page) IBM vitality Sciences (Success)In 2000, IbM began a programmatic effort, (termed the acclivitous business Organization or EbO), to identify and develop cross-IbM business that could provide $1b in revenue in spite of appearance a 5-year time frame. In April of that year, Carol kovac, an IbM R manager, was asked to establish a new Life science business that would capitalize on the increase demand for computing being generated by the genomic revolution. amongst its founding and 2006, Carol grew the business to $5b in revenue. IBM Middleware (Success) In 1998, IbMs software discrepancy was in turmoil. in that respect were contrary pressures to continue to develop and service software for their existing installed base that re lied heavily on mainframe computers and to develop radically new products ground on the emerging populace Wide Web. Resolving this required that their sr. managers exploit existing programming languages and customers and to explore new languages and markets. They accomplished this by accordantly establishing different units and carefully integrating them at older levels. cisco TelePresence (Success) Cisco systems is a $22b company that sells plumbing for the internet.It has grown at 12-17% annually and currently has a overabundant market share in its main businesses. As a part of his effort to continue Cisco systems growth, John Chambers, the CEO, has launched an driven initiative to identify 30 new potential $1b businesses. His aim is to generate 25% of the firms revenues from these new ventures at heart 5-10 age. In October 2006, one of these efforts (TelePresence) was launched as an intimate venture to develop high-end video conferencing. since therefore the business h as grown from two informal entrepreneurs and a sheet of news root word publisher to more than 100 people and $200M in revenue.Misys flock (Success) Misys is a $1b software firm change service and systems to health care and banking clients. As a part of a backsliding effort commenced in 2007, the new CEO initiated a cost-cutting effort in the climb on business and proposed a new spread out source approach to replace the existing proprietary programme. To ensure the success of this disruptive approach, he set up a new exploratory unit and re placed several members of his higher-ranking team who were resisting the new approach. by 2010, the new open source political program had opened up new markets and attracted a significant number of new customers.DaVita Rx (Success) daVita is a $6b business that derives the bulk of its revenues from operating kidney dialysis centers. In 2004, kent Thiry, the CEO, formed a team to identify new business opportunities that would match daVita s clinical skills with economic opportunities. One opportunity identified was to provide prescription drugs to degenerative kidney patients. begun in 2004, daVita Rx was an internal start-up with a different business model, metrics, and margins than the big daVita. by 2010, this new business was generating $220M in revenue with cd employees.Defense Corp (Success) defense Corp is a $6b provider of hardware and systems to the u. s. military giving medication. In 2005, in an attempt to carry their customer base the company initiated an effort to sell technology to the newly naturalised Homeland guarantor Agency. Although the initiative was authorise by the CEO, development funding and cooperation from main lines of business were slow in climax until a separate unit was naturalised with a cause charter, appropriate metrics, and an reorient fourth-year team. The new unit late won a $13M contract. Ciba visual modality (Success)In the early 1990s, Ciba visual modality, a mak er of soft contact lenses and lens solutions, was losing ground to their larger competitors, J and bausch and Lomb. In a unmixed move, Glenn bradley, the President, halted all incremental innovation and placed six bets on revolutionary new products such as extended hold lenses and daily disposables. These new units were encouraged to establish their own alignments (people, structure, culture) as they pursued their discovery innovation. With the success of several of these, revenues tripled over the nigh decade.Zensar Technologies (Success) In 2002, Zensar Technologies, a mid-sized Indian IT services firm was losing market share and tell apart talent. There was substantial tension between a potentially promising new technology platform and the existing geographical business units. A new CEO shifted Zensar to a product-focused firm but unplowed the new technology venture as a business unit report to his office. In 2008, after the entrepreneurial units technology and business mo del was validated this unit and its innovative business model was integrated into the product units. all over the five-year period, Zensar was able to build its core business even as it brought to the market a fundamentally new technology. CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT check into VOL. 53, NO. 4 suMMER 2011 CMR. bERkELEy. Edu 11 Organizational Ambidexterity in Action How Managers Explore and Exploit flurry 1. sample description (continued from previous page) fall guy Business-by-Design ( distress) In 2006, the CEO of eat up say that future revenue growth for the company was in the small and Medium business market and selling software on demand. This software-as-a-service product (business-by-design or byd) was authentic but no separate unit was established.Although this market has grown substantially, sAP has failed to successfully market their offering. In 2010, the CEO, Leo Apotheker, was fired for failing to implement business-by-design. HP Scanner (Declining to Success) blood lin e in 1991, HPs scanner division had begun to develop a portable scanner to complement their flatbed product. For five years they had failed to commercialize any of their inventions. In 1996, a new division GM illogical out the handheld business into an double-tongued unit that was physically uninvolved from the flatbed business and had its own people, systems, incentives, and culture. ii years later, this business was successful enough to be spun-out as its own division. depression Company ( bolt outure) In 2007, faced with increased competition and declining customer satisfaction and enjoyment of their core legal research products, the precedential managers of the business decided to reinvent their business as a web-establish publisher based on a new open source architecture. In spite of a clear vision of the future, heavy investment in the new technology, and a promise to rescue the company, the new product has failed to reignite growth.The new unit has faced continual resis tance from the more mature part of the business. food turner Technologies (Declining to Success) The Advanced IC division of Turner had copes of growth in new products as well as quality in its existing product line. While the divisions strategic intent was clear, it could not get traction on both exercise issue until it split out the innovative strategic agenda from its existing product line. Energized by two new managers reporting the divisional GM and a rearticulated individuation for the division, Turner was able to both trenchantly explore and exploit.software product Company (Failure) under pressure from corporate executives, the general manager of software Company articulated a strategic intent to both build on its struggling extant product line and initiate a remarkable set of new software solutions. This general manager build a separate unit, reporting directly to him, to focus on innovation. Over a trine-year period, he did not, however, staff or fund this innovati ve unit. The unit underperformed in its existing as well as its innovative product line. IBM Network Technologies (Declining to Success)A highly entrepreneurial general manager articulated a strategic intent to exploit her existing chip line even as she promised to explore into fundamentally new chips. yet her zeal for exploration led her to build a business unit only focused on exploration. Her extant product line suffered. under pressure from corporate staff and client dissatisfaction, the general manager rebuilt her fourth-year team and her business unit to focus help on both her current product as well as her new product lines. the States Today (Declining to Success) In the late 1990s, the States Today, like most u. s. ewspapers, began to see a decline in both circulation and advertising revenues as web-based news began to supplant brand. In response to this trend, tom turkey Curley, the papers publisher, adopted a network strategy which accentd the obstetrical delivery of news content across three platforms, print, the web, and TV. between 1999 and 2002, he was successful at managing this transition and simultaneously delivering news content across the three platforms-with the result that requital increased by 50 percent. 12 uNIVERsITy OF CALIFORNIA, bERkELEy VOL. 53, NO. 4 suMMER 2011 CMR. bERkELEy. EduOrganizational Ambidexterity in Action How Managers Explore and Exploit prorogue 2. Interview Results (continued on next page) strategic intent that intellectually justifies double-dealing form raft and value that promote a common identity but separate cultures higher-ranking team that explicitly owns the bimanual strategy (common-fate pays, communication) fraudulent leadership (conflict resolution, resource apportioning) separate units with align architectures and targeted integration ( aged(a) level and tactical) suggestion 1 offer 2 suggestion 3 Proposition 4 Proposition 5 SuccessIbM Life sciences yes yes yes 100% of pension for sen ior executives yes yes yes 70% of bonus yes EbO structure yes success $5b in revenue in 6 years Cisco TelePresence yes Council/ circuit board structure yes geographically separate yes daVita Rx yes yes yes but some initial disputes over self-sufficiency yes but some conflict over metrics and rewards yes senior leader integrates Ciba Vision yes yes Healthy eyes for life yes yes Geographically separate Explore report to senior team IbM Middleware yes yes beat bEA yes senior leaders agree on a new structure yes yes Geographically separate units yes unambiguous unit for new platform es senior leaders integration yes accent held at top Zensar Technologies yes yes Among the top Indian IT services sloppeds Misys yes yes drive productivity and present yes Replaced old team with new one yes Open source reports to CEO yes CEO drove the new effort CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOL. 53, NO. 4 suMMER 2011 CMR. bERkELEy. Edu boilers suit Performance success $200M in revenue in 4 years success $220M in revenue in 6 years success tripled sales in 10 years success old and new products have both profit and growth duple from 20052010 success certain new platform with new customers 13Organizational Ambidexterity in Action How Managers Explore and Exploit TABLe 2. Interview Results (continued from previous page, continued on next page) strategic intent that intellectually justifies ambidextrous form Vision and values that promote a common identity but separate cultures senior team that explicitly owns the ambidextrous strategy (common-fate rewards, communication) Ambidextrous leadership (conflict resolution, resource allocation) separate units with aligned architectures and targeted integration (senior level and tactical) Proposition 1 Proposition 2Proposition 3 Proposition 4 Proposition 5 defense Corp yes No but did set new explore culture yes After initial resistance yes unit reports to President yes used adviser to mediate conflict Failure sAP businessby-design yes No N o disputes over revenue recognition yes but the strategy does not fit well with current one yes yes save the company No short-run revenue still dominates No clear ambidextrous unit or leader No Continued conflicts over who owns the customer No Ambidextrous unit not represented Failure lack of sagacity in targeted markets Failureno new growthPrinting Company No Explore unit not protected software Co No No yes No Transition to Success usA Today yes yes Network, not a paper H-P scanner yes No No because yes senior team bonus based on overall performance No to yes yes separate units with targeted integration No then yes Physically separate units No to yes imaging allocation to web-based business No to yes senior leader integrates stalled to success increased net profit 50% in 3 years stalled to success then innovation unit spun out 14 uNIVERsITy OF CALIFORNIA, bERkELEy VOL. 53, NO. suMMER 2011 CMR. bERkELEy. Edu Overall Performance success win $13M in new contracts Poor entry Pe rformance Organizational Ambidexterity in Action How Managers Explore and Exploit TABLe 2. Interview Results (continued from previous page) strategic intent that intellectually justifies ambidextrous form Vision and values that promote a common identity but separate cultures senior team that explicitly owns the ambidextrous strategy (common-fate rewards, communication) Ambidextrous leaders (conflict resolution, resource allocation) eparate units with aligned architectures and targeted integration (senior level and tactical) Proposition 1 Proposition 2 Proposition 3 Proposition 4 Proposition 5 Turner Technologies yes yes No to yes No to yes No to yes IbM Network Technologies yes No to yes yes No to yes No to yes possibly helpful, a clear strategic intent may not be a necessary condition for execution of instrument ambidextrous designs. The second proposition suggested the importance of a common vision and values as necessary to promote a common identity across explore and exploit un its.Here the evidence is more often than not invariable with proposition two. Six of the cardinal consistently high-performing firms had a clear over-arching vision and common values. In contrast, two of the three poor performing firms did not have such clarity. Printing Company (pseudonym) had a senior team that both articulated a clear strategic intent as well as an overarching vision and identity. This senior team could not, however, execute against this clear strategy and overarching identity. Moreover, three of the quad firms that in condition(p) how to be ambidextrous had or developed a well-defined vision.For example, at USA Today there was an explicit strategy to be a network, not a newspaper. The over-arching aspiration was to be the local paper for the global village. This strategy and vision, and a common set of values around fairness, accuracy, and trust, helped interlace together a highly secernate organization. Of the twelve firms able to execute ambidextrous designs, only HP Scanner and Misys were able to implement the ambidextrous design without an overarching identity.Thus, while not definitive, the evidence suggests that a common vision is an eventful discriminator of more- versus less-successful ambidextrous designs, but not necessarily a sufficient one. The third proposition argued for the importance of a consensus in the senior team about the ambidextrous strategy and a common-fate reward system indoors the team to promote this. Our data supports this proposition. In each of the three instances of failure, there was a lack of consensus within the senior team about the relative importance of ambidexterity and there was no CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOL. 3, NO. 4 suMMER 2011 CMR. bERkELEy. Edu Overall Performance declining to improving declining to Improving 15 Organizational Ambidexterity in Action How Managers Explore and Exploit common-fate reward system for the senior team. Interviews suggested that the existing reward syst ems that were based on sub-unit or functional performance were a major cause of the unfitness of the organization to leverage common assets. In the case of SAP, these disputes played out in the un unbiddenness of the sales force to promote lower-margin new products and disputes among senior managers about revenue recognition.In the publish company case, short-run financial pressures and the lack of any common-fate reward for the senior team resulted in a focus on achieving short-term revenue targets through the older but higher-margin products. Similarly, at Defense Corp, Whites Homeland Security initiative was initially argue by other members of the senior team because of its inability to generate short-term revenue. The dubiety of a long sales-cycle associated with a new government customer was overwhelmed by the short-term metrics of revenue and gross margin.The senior teams systems for evaluating performance lacked the mental object to evaluate a business at a more immature arrange of development. In contrast, in the most-successful ambidextrous efforts, the senior team was heavily incented to promote both explore and exploit businesses. In the Cisco TelePresence case, members of the governance team (Boards and Councils) had a significant portion of their bonus contingent on the success of both units. In the successful DaVita Rx case, there were initial disputes within the senior team about metrics and margins that were only resolved after a common-fate reward system was installed.At Misys, senior team resistance was overcome only after Lawrie replaced the opposing managers. Importantly, in three of the four cases where the firms lettered how to be ambidextrous, there was a shift from a lack of consensus possession about the importance of the exploratory effort to a fully committed senior team. This shift in top team ownership of the ambidextrous strategy relate the creation of common-fate incentive systems, a shift in leadership behaviors of the se nior manager, and, in several cases, turnover within the senior team.The fourth condition proposed as necessary for successful ambidexterity was the presence of separate aligned architectures for the explore and exploit units conjugate with targeted integration to ensure that common resources were leveraged across units. In all three instances of failure, these unadorned alignments were conspicuously missing. In the case of SAP, state for the exploratory venture (software-as-a-service) was split between two functional heads with the result that effective coordination never occurred and decisions were do slowly.At Software Company (pseudonym), a separate exploratory unit was established on paper but never staffed. In each of these ambidextrous failures, the locus of integration between the needs of the exploratory and exploitative activities was either too low in the firm or was ambiguous. In contrast, in each successful case there were ceaselessly separate explore and exploit u nits with senior-level integration to ensure that resources were allocated. At IBM this was done either through their EBO process (e. g. in Life Sciences)25 or, in the Middleware case, through the establishment of diaphanous units focused on different time horizons that is, mature, growth, and emerging 16 uNIVERsITy OF CALIFORNIA, bERkELEy VOL. 53, NO. 4 suMMER 2011 CMR. bERkELEy. Edu Organizational Ambidexterity in Action How Managers Explore and Exploit products. At Cisco this was done through a Boards and Councils process where there was a clear allocation of responsibilities, resources, and structures. In all successful cases, the exploratory units were initially physically separated from the exploit parts of the business.Similarly, for three of the four firms that learn how to be ambidextrous, there was a switch in organization design from an integrated approach (e. g. , project teams) to the establishment of separate units for explore and explore businesses. The final core m echanism proposed as classical for successful ambidexterity was the ability of the ambidextrous leader to resolve the inevitable conflicts and resource allocation decisions that this organization design entails. This too is an important discriminator between more- versus less-successful ambidextrous designs.In each failure case this capability was lacking. At SAP there were continual disputes about resources and responsibilities across the combat-ready functions without a clear mechanism or clear leadership for resolution. In the printing firm, although there was a separate explore unit with a amenable manager, he reported to an exploit manager who was held responsible for margins and short-term revenues. The exploratory unit manager was not represented on the senior team with the result that his voice was not heard when exact resource decisions were made.In contrast, in each successful case, there was a clear, acknowledgeable leader and assemblage to resolve conflicts and mak e definitive resource allocation decisions. For example, at Zensar, even though there were substantial conflicts between the existing business units and the new integrative software platform, the CEO saw to it that his team actually dealt with these conflicts and made the appropriate resource allocation shifts between the existing units. At Misys, Mike Lawrie ensured that resources needed for the new open source effort were allocated in a by the way manner.Similarly, in each of the four units that learned how to be ambidextrous, the general manager changed the senior team composition and processes to resolve conflicts associated with exploration and exploitation. For instance, at USA Today, only after Curley replaced several members of his team was his firm able to excel at both print and web-based content delivery. Similarly, only after the division general manager changed her leadership course at IBMs Network engine room Division was her team able to balance resource allocation and decision fashioning between her explore and exploit business lines. The caution of AmbidexterityOne of the key features of ambidexterity is the ability of the organization to reapportion assets and capabilities to address new threats and opportunities. Practically speaking, this gist that leaders within the organization are able to make the difficult choices required to reconfigure assets to promote exploratory ventures. The results from these fifteen case studies suggest that there are identifiable core mechanisms that discriminate between more- versus less-successful ambidextrous designs in action. The most-successful ambidextrous designs had leaders who developed a clear vision and common identity (Proposition 2),CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOL. 53, NO. 4 suMMER 2011 CMR. bERkELEy. Edu 17 Organizational Ambidexterity in Action How Managers Explore and Exploit built senior teams that were committed to the ambidextrous strategy and were incented to both explore and exploit (Proposition 3), employed distinct and aligned subunits to focus on either exploration or exploitation (Proposition 4), and built teams that could deal with the resource allocations and conflicts associated with exploration and exploitation (Proposition 5). Those less-successful attempts at ambidexterity did not employ these core mechanisms.Although useful, the articulation of a clear strategic intent (Proposition 1) and, to a lesser extent, the provision of an overarching vision (Proposition 2) did not discriminate between the more- versus less-successful attempts to build an ambidextrous organization. This suggests that articulating why ambidexterity is important is not the same as how it is implemented. In the slaying of an ambidextrous design, execution appears to trump strategy. The first two propositions (articulating a strategy and overarching vision for the ambidextrous form) are the easy part for senior managers.The next three propositions are about strategic execution. Th ese require hard choices about resource allocation, leader behavior, senior team composition (or replacement), and the balancing of contradictory organizational architectures. The most-successful ambidextrous designs had more of these components from the beginning. In contrast, those firms that learned how to be ambidextrous struggled with at least two of these core components and only after resolving these were they to effectively implement an ambidextrous design.These results suggest that effective ambidextrous designs are based on a set of interrelated choices made by the leader. some(prenominal) subset of the core mechanisms is associated with underperformance. As such, executing ambidextrous designs can be seen as a complex senior leadership task that requires an integrated set of strategic, structural, incentive, and top team process decisions. Clearly, successful ambidextrous designs require more than the simple organizational structural decision in which the exploratory an d exploitative subunits are separated.The critical elements, and perhaps the more difficult elements, are the processes by which these units are integrated in a value enhancing way. raillery These results are largely consistent with Teeces observation that dynamic capabilities reside in large measure with the enterprises top management team. 26 Concretely, it appears that ambidexterity as a dynamic capability rests on the ability of leaders not only to articulate a strategic intent and vision that justifies exploration and exploitation, butmore importantlyto manage the inherent tensions associated with incompatible organizational architectures.These results also extend previous research that has coupled transformational leadership to successful ambidexterity by explicating some of the core processes that underpin the transformational leadership construct. 27 These mechanisms are largely consistent with earlier research. For example, our findings that senior team consensus is an im portant ingredient in the implementation of ambidexterity is consistent with previous research screening that the behavioral integration 18 uNIVERsITy OF CALIFORNIA, bERkELEy VOL. 53, NO. 4 suMMER 2011 CMR. bERkELEy. EduOrganizational Ambidexterity in Action How Managers Explore and Exploit of the senior team is a forerunner to successful ambidexterity. 28 Similarly, the importance of targeted integration and clear incentives documented here has also been suggested in previous studies. 29 The critical aspect of resource allocation illustrated here has also been seen in previous studies, especially in research showing that failed efforts at renewal stem not from a lack of technology or resources but the inability of senior managers to allocate those resources effectively to the exploratory effort. 0 Finally, while each component characteristic of ambidextrous designs is important, it appears that it is the set of components interacting together that define the dynamic capabilities that drive effective ambidextrous designs. 31 These patterns suggest concrete yet integrated sets of actions that leaders can take to execute strategies that hide both exploration and exploitation. At Misys, Mike Lawrie articulated his strategic intent for open source software solutions at a senior team offsite. He kept Misys Open Source as a separate unit reporting to his office.He also emphasized the need for cost and quality progress in his existing business units even as he encouraged disciplined experimentation in the open source unit. As a leader, Lawrie was able to tolerate the competition between Misys Open Source and other platforms and was willing to risk shortterm revenue to help create longer-term options with a potentially disruptive technology. He has seen his strategy pay dividends. The healthcare business unit revenues grew more than 30% in 2009 with Misys Open Source as the foot for important new contracts with hospitals, physicians, and insurers.At the same time , Open Source has triggered innovation into other Misys unitsa new banking product has large open source components, and the Misys website is completely open source. To realize the potential of SBP at Zensar, Ganesh Natarajan made the decision to keep SBP separate from the other units. He clarified his strategic and stimulated rationale for exploration and exploitation with his senior team and, for the next two years, relentlessly emphasized both exploration and exploitation. By 2008, SBP had almost doubled its number of clients as well as profits.Having demonstrated its success technically and in the market, SBP was then reintegrated within the main business in 2008. Finally, at Defense Corp, Caroline White reliable approval to separate her homeland security exploration unit and built a new management system and metrics for gauging progress of this business. She also changed the incentives of her top team so that they were all accountable for both short-term results as well as lo nger-term results. By 2010, the exploratory unit turn up its value, winning a $13M contract with the dishonour Security Agency for improving circuit security at U. S. irports. Conclusion There is now convincing evidence suggesting that for organizations to survive in the face of change, they need to be able to successfully exploit their existing businesses and to explore into new spaces by reconfiguring existing resources and developing new capabilities. 32 While the evidence for the benefits CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOL. 53, NO. 4 suMMER 2011 CMR. bERkELEy. Edu 19 Organizational Ambidexterity in Action How Managers Explore and Exploit of ambidexterity is accumulating, there exists a gap in understanding how ambidexterity is actually managed within organizations.This article has explored how leaders within organizations actually implement ambidexterity. The actions, behaviors, and design choices made by the senior leader comprise the dynamic capabilities that enable firms to simultaneously explore and exploit and emphasize the key role of strategic leadership in adapting, integrating, and reconfiguring organizational skills and resources to match changing environments. Notes 1. Charles I. Stubbart and Michael B. Knight, The Case of the Disappearing Firms falsifiable designate and Implications, daybook of Organizational Behavior, 27/1 (February 2006) 79-100. . Ibid. , p. 96. 3. Rajshree Agarwal and Michael Gort, The Evolution of Markets and Entry, Exit, and Survival of Firms, Review of Economics and Statistics, 78/3 (August 1996) 489-498. 4. Paul Ormerod, Why Most Things Fail (New York, NY Pantheon Books, 2005), p. 18. 5. Leslie Hannah, marshalls Trees and the Global Forest Were teras Redwoods Different? Center for Economic Performance, Discussion Paper 318, 1997. 6. See James G. March, exploration and exploitation in Organizational Learning, Organization Science, 2/1 (February 1991) 7187 James G.March, The Evolution of Evolution, in J. Baum and J. Singh, eds. , evolutionary kinetics of Organizations (New York, NY Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 39-52. 7. For interesting examples of how biological evolution might apply to organizations, see Tim Harford, aline Why Success Always Starts With Failure (New York, NY Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011) Martin A. Nowak and Roger Highfield, Supercooperators Altruism, Evolution and Why We Need from each one Other to Succeed (New York, NY Free Press, 2011) Charles A. OReilly, J. Bruce Harreld, and Michael L.Tushman, Organizational Ambidexterity IBM and Emerging Business Opportunities, California wariness Review, 51/4 (Summer 2009) 75-99 Ormerod, op. cit. 8. Hannah, op. cit. , p. 19. 9. See, for example, Ze-Lin He and Poh-Kam Wong, exploration vs. Exploitation An Empirical Test of Ambidexterity, Organization Science, 15/4 (July/August 2004) 481-494 Sebastian Raisch, Julian Birkinshaw, Gilbert Probst, and Michael L. Tushman, Organizational Ambidexterity reconciliation Exploitatio n and Exploration for Sustained Performance, Organization Science, 20/4 (July/August 2009) 685-695 Michael L.Tushman and Charles A. OReilly, The Ambidextrous Organization Managing Evolutionary and Revolutionary intensify, California direction Review, 38/4 (Summer 1996) 8-30. 10. For a revaluation of the growing literature on dynamic capabilities, see V. Ambrosini and C. Bowman, What be high-power Capabilities and Are They a Useful Construct in strategical vigilance? International Journal of direction Reviews, 11/1 (March 2009) 29-49 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt and Jeffrey A. Martin, Dynamic Capabilities What Are They? strategical vigilance Journal, 21/10-11 (October/November 2000) 11051121 J.Bruce Harreld, Charles A. OReilly, and Michael L. Tushman, Dynamic Capabilities at IBM hotheaded Strategy into Action, California precaution Review, 49/4 (Summer 2007) 21-43 Constance E. Helfat, Sydney Finkelstein, Will Mitchell, Margaret A. Peteraf, Harbir Singh, David J. Teece, and Si dney G. Winter, Dynamic Capabilities arrangement Strategic Change in Organizations (Malden, MA Blackwell Publishing, 2007) David J. Teece, Gary Pisano, and Amy Shuen, Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management, Strategic Management Journal, 18/7 (August 1997) 509-533. 1. C. OReilly and M. Tushman, Ambidexterity as a Dynamic strength Resolving the Innovators predicament, Research in Organizational Behavior, 28 (2008) 190. 12. Harreld et al. (2007), op. cit. David J. Teece, Explicating Dynamic Capabilities The Nature and Microfoundations of (Sustainable) Enterprise Performance, Strategic Management Journal, 28 (December 2007) 1319-1350. 13. See, for example, Vijay Govindarajan and Chris Trimble, Building Breakthrough Businesses within Established Organizations, Harvard Business Review, 83/5 May 2005) 58-68 Justin P. Jansen, Frans A. Tempelaar, Frans A. cutting edge den Bosch, and Henk W. Volberda, geomorphological 20 uNIVERsITy OF CALIFORNIA, bERkELEy VOL. 53, NO. 4 suMMER 20 11 CMR. bERkELEy. Edu Organizational Ambidexterity in Action How Managers Explore and Exploit 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. Differentiation and Ambidexterity The Mediating region of Integration Mechanisms, Organization Science, 20/4 (July/August 2009) 797-811 Michael H. Lubatkin, Zeki Simsek, Yan Ling, and John F.Veiga, Ambidexterity and Performance in Small- to Medium-Sized Firms The Pivotal business office of TMT Behavioral Integration, Journal of Management, 32/5 (2006) 646672 Tom J. Mom, Frans A. Van den Bosch, and Henk W. Volberda, intelligence Variation in Managers Ambidexterity canvass Direct and Interaction Effects of bollock Structural and Personal Coordination Mechanisms, Organization Science, 20/4 (July/August 2009) 812-828 Sebastian Raisch and Julian Birkinshaw, Organizational Ambidexterity Antecedents, Outcomes, and Moderators, Journal of Management, 34/3 (June 2008) 375-409 Michael L.Tushman, Wendy K. Smith, Robert C. Wood, George Westerman, and Charles A. OReilly, Organizational Designs and novelty Streams, industrial and Corporate Change, 19/5 (October 2010) 1331-1366. OReilly and Tushman (2008), op cit. Clay M. Christensen, The Innovators Dilemma When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (Boston, MA Harvard Business School Press, 1997) Erwin Danneels, The kinetics of Product Innovation and Firm Competences, Strategic Management Journal, 23/12 (December 2002) 1095-1121 March (1991), op. it. bloody shame Tripsas and Giovanni Gavetti, Capabilities, Cognition, and inertia Evidence from digital Imaging, Strategic Management Journal, 21/1011 (October/November 2000) 1147-1161. gook Bazerman and Michael Watkins, Predictable Surprises (Boston, MA Harvard Business School Press, 2004) Mary J. Benner and Michael L. Tushman, Exploitation, Exploration and Process Management The Productivity Dilemma Revisited, Academy of Management Review, 28/2 (April 2003) 238-256 March (1991), op. cit. Justin J.Jansen, Dusya Vera, and Mary Crossan , Strategic Leadership for Exploration and Exploitation The Moderating Role of Environmental Dynamism, Leadership Quarterly, 20/1 (February 2009) 5-18 R. Scott Livengood and Rhonda K. Reger, Thats Our sodomist Identity Domains and Competitive Dynamics, Academy of Management Review, 35/1 (January 2010) 48-66 Louise A. Nemanich and Dusya Vera, Transformational Leadership and Ambidexterity in the Context of an Acquisition, Leadership Quarterly, 20/1 (February 2009) 19-33. Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, and Veiga, op. cit. Jatinder Sidhu, Henk Volberda, and Harry Commandeur, Exploring Exploration orientation and Its Determinants Some Empirical Evidence, Journal of Management Studies, 41/6 (September 2004) 913-932. Christine M. Beckman, The Influence of creation squad Company Affiliations on Firm Behavior, Academy of Management Journal, 49/4 (August 2006) 741-758 J. Jansen, G. George, F. Van den Bosch, and H. Volberda, Senior Team Attributes and Organizational Ambidexterity The Moderating Ro le of Transformational Leadership, Journal of Management Studies, 45/5 (July 008) 982-1007. Charles A. OReilly and Michael L. Tushman, The Ambidextrous Organization, Harvard Business Review, 82/4 (April 2004) 74-83 Nicolaj Siggelkow and Daniel Levinthal, Temporarily Divide to check Centralized, Decentralized, and Reintegrated Organizational Approaches to Exploration and Adaptation, Organization Science, 14/6 (November/December 2003) 650-669. Clark Gilbert, Unbundling the Structure of Inertia Resource versus Routine Rigidity, Academy of Management Journal, 48/5 (October 2005) 741-763 Mom, Van den Bosch, and Volberda, op. cit. Charles A. OReilly, David F. Caldwell, Jennifer A. Chatman, Margaret Lapiz, and William Self, How Leadership Matters The Effects of Leaders Alignment on Strategy Implementation, Leadership Quarterly, 21/1 (February 2010) 104-113 Wendy K. Smith and Michael L. Tushman, Managing Strategic Contradictions A Top Management baffle for Managing Innovation Streams, Org anization Science, 16/5 (September/October 2005) 522-536. V. J. Gilchrest, Key Informant Interviews, in B. F. Crabtree and W. L. Miller, eds. , Doing qualitative Research (London Sage, 1992).This research used a multi-case design in which cases were written for each of the fifteen ambidexterity efforts (e. g. , Eisenhardt, 1989). These cases were then used to generate insights into those actions that were more or less likely to be associated with the successful implementation of an ambidextrous form. Each of the 15 cases was compared to the five propositions suggested by OReilly and Tushman (2008). Given the exploratory and qualitative nature of this investigation and the nature of our convenience sample, any results are necessarily tentative.CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOL. 53, NO. 4 suMMER 2011 CMR. bERkELEy. Edu 21 Organizational Ambidexterity in Action How Managers Explore and Exploit 24. Govindarajan and Trimble, op. cit. Charles H. House and Raymond L. Price, The HP Phenomen on Innovation and Business Transformation (Stanford, CA Stanford University Press, 2009) Richard S. Rosenbloom, Leadership, Capabilities, and scientific Change The Transformation of NCR in the electronic Era, Strategic Management Journal, 21/10-11 (October/ November 2000) 1083-1103. 25.OReilly, Harreld, and Tushman, (2009) op cit. 26. Teece (2007), op cit. , p. 146. 27. Jansen, George, Van den Bosch, and Volberda, op. cit. Jansen, Vera, and Crossan, op. cit. Nemanich and Vera, op. cit. Smith and Tushman, op. cit. 28. For example, see Beckman (2006), op. cit. Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, and Veiga, op. cit. Alva Taylor and Constance E. Helfat, Organizational Linkages for Surviving Technological Change Complementary Assets, Middle Management, and Ambidexterity, Organization Science, 20/4 (July/August 2009) 718-739. 9. See Jansen, Tempelaar, Van den Bosch, and Volberda, op. cit. OReilly and Tushman (2004), op. cit. Wendy K. Smith, Managing Strategic Ambidexterity Top Management Team s and Cognitive Processes to Explore and Exploit Simultaneously, paper presented at the twenty-fifth EGOS Colloquium, Barcelona, July 3, 2009 Tushman, Smith, Wood, Westerman, and OReilly, op. cit. 30. For example, see Gilbert, op. cit. Robert Sobel, When Giants Stumble genuine Business Blunders and How to Avoid Them (Paramus, NJ apprentice Hall, 1999) Donald N.Sull, The Dynamics of Standing Still Firestone consume and Rubber and the Radial Revolution, Business narrative Review, 73/3 (Autumn 1999) 430-464 Tripsas and Gavetti, op. cit. 31. Harreld, OReilly, and Tushman (2007), op. cit. Jan Rivkin and Nicolaj Siggelkow, Balancing Search and Stability Interdependencies among Elements of Organizational Design, Management Science, 49/3 (March 2003) 290-311 Richard Wittington, Andrew Pettigrew, Simon Peck, Evelyn Penton, and Martin Conyon, Change and Complementarities in the New Competitive Landscape, Organization Science, 10/5 (September/October 1999) 583-600. 2. Matthew S. Olson an d Derek Van Bever, Stall Points (New Haven, CT Yale University Press, 2008) Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008), op. cit. Juha Uotila, Markku Maula, and Thomas Keil, and Shaker A. Zhara, Exploration, Exploitation and financial Performance Analysis of S 500 Corporations, Strategic Management Journal, 30/2 (February 2009) 221-231. 22 uNIVERsITy OF CALIFORNIA, bERkELEy VOL. 53, NO. 4 suMMER 2011 CMR. bERkELEy. Edu